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 31 
CONTRACT SPORTS 
MARTHA M. ERTMAN1 
This symposium issue on Re-Orienting Law and Sexuality explores the topic in 
innovative ways, mining commonalities among sex work, sexual orientation 
marginalization, and sexual speech.  My work fits into this discussion in that I 
explore ways that the private law of commerce can be imported to the private law of 
domestic relations to remedy family law’s inadequacy and inequality.  Existing 
domestic relations law posits heterosexual marriage as naturally superior to other 
forms of intimate affiliation, rendering the others (such as cohabitation, same-sex 
sexuality, and polyamory) unnatural and inferior.  As such, it fails to recognize many 
intimate affiliations.2 
Two examples of bridging the divide between private business law and private 
family law that I discuss in this essay are cohabitation contracts and Premarital 
Security Agreements.  Cohabitation contracts use contract doctrine to recognize 
relationships that judges otherwise would likely ignore or vilify.   Premarital Security 
Agreements (PSAs) are the centerpiece of my proposal for importing the debtor-
creditor law of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to marriage doctrine.  As 
described below, I have contended that primary homemakers extend credit to their 
primary wage-earning spouses, and that they therefore should be seen as creditors, 
and thus able to exercise creditor rights such as the self-help right of repossession 
enjoyed by secured creditors.3  This work is part of an antisubordination literature 
that includes feminist legal theory, critical race theory, and queer legal theory.   It 
builds on those theories’ contributions by questioning their conventional focus on 
public law, instead asking what tools private law offers to counter subordination.   
What follows is a lightly edited text of my remarks at the conference, sketching 
the contours of a case for private business law’s potential to help us reimagine the 
legal construct of family.  Because contract is the metaphor underlying all business 
models, and because, as I shall shortly explain, I think that the music played at 
sporting events sets an appropriate tone of discussion regarding the contest over 
                                                                
1Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law.  Thanks to Tayyab Mahmud 
and Ratna Kapur for organizing a stellar conference and inviting me to join, to the conference 
participants for their incisive comments on my presentation, and to Julie Nice for her helpful 
comments on this essay. 
2One example of the changing demographics of intimate affiliation is the fact that fully 
one third of births in the U.S. each year are to unmarried mothers.  Tamar Lewin, Fears for 
Children’s Well-Being Complicate Debate Over Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2000.  For 
further discussion of the patchwork of legal doctrines governing various affiliations, see 
Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. 
CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 79 (2001). 
3Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work 
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998).  The “special rights” 
enjoyed by Article 9 secured creditors can be analogized to the special rights for gay people 
that Karen Engle ably defends in this symposium.  Karen Engle, Legislating Special Rights, 48 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (2000). 
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whose intimate affiliations count as “family,”  my approach can be aptly described as 
contract sports. 
As our topic today is reorienting law and sexuality, it seems that we really need a 
new theme song.  Those who have been “out” for a few years have doubtless noticed 
that one song is played at every parade, march, party, and other gay event: Sister 
Sledge’s song We Are Family.4   This song suggests that same sex couples can create 
legitimate families.  Its perennial popularity reflects the gay community’s efforts to 
win social legitimacy as families.  This goal could be achieved in two ways, either by 
successfully arguing that gay families are as natural as heterosexual ones, or by 
attacking the very idea that some families are natural while others are unnatural.5  I 
have noticed in the panels today a theme of denaturalizing the family as a part of 
reorienting law and sexuality.  In that same vein I would like to suggest that we pick 
a new theme song to accompany the efforts of sexually marginalized people to 
denaturalize the family. The song I suggest is Queen’s We Are the Champions.6 
As a song played at virtually every sporting event graced by a sound system, We 
Are the Champions is familiar to everyone.  Another benefit is that the very title 
suggests an offensive rather than defensive posture, declaring victory rather than 
arguing for inclusion.  Rather than asserting a right to inclusion in the family as it 
stands, an add-and-stir approach suggesting that legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships will not significantly alter the family, the song recognizes an 
adversarial posture towards a legal system that is fundamentally hostile to our very 
humanity, challenging us to fashion some sort of new regime that includes gay 
people and other marginalized groups.  Moreover, the group’s name, Queen, 
suggests affiliation with the gay community.  The fact that a group of men who call 
themselves Queen sing this extraordinarily butch song (“we are the champions/ no 
time for losers/ we are the champions of the world”),7 which is played in the 
extraordinarily butch environment of athletic contests, references the contingency of 
gender identity by aligning nellie queens with brute physical strength.  Imagine 
crowing at a gay pride march, “we are the champions, no time for losers, we are the 
champions of the world.”  
If We are the Champions is adopted as the new gay theme song, two questions 
must be addressed:  who are “we,” and what does it mean to be a champion.  One 
way to answer these questions is by adopting a “queer” posture.  Queer is a post-
modern term of art adopted by queer theorists.8  Related to, but separate from the 
                                                                
4Sister Sledge, We are Family, MILLENNIUM DISCO PARTY (2000). 
5The second approach challenges the naturalized model of family to suggest that it should 
be replaced by some other model, such as a functionalist model that recognizes various 
intimate affiliations based on the needs of the participants rather than a judgment that some 
relationships, deemed natural, get premiere rights and responsibilities, while others, deemed 
unnatural or less natural, receive either obloquy or lesser rights and responsibilities than the 
relationships deemed natural.  This essay focuses on this approach.  For further discussion, see 
Ertman, supra note 2. 
6Queen, We Are the Champions, QUEEN’S GREATEST HITS (1992). 
7Id. 
8Lisa Duggan, Making It Perfectly Queer, in SEX WARS:  SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL 
CULTURE 155 (Lisa Duggan and Nan Hunter eds., 1995). 
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term gay, the term queer affects a significant theoretical change that explicitly rejects 
the relevance of conduct and status in determining identity.  Just as orange juice is no 
longer only for breakfast, as Anita Bryant said in the 1970s, queer sexual orientation 
is no longer only for those who engage in (or desire to engage in) same-sex 
sexuality. 
According to queer theory, the delineations between gay and straight are 
fundamentally contingent:  people come and go from each category during their 
lives, and membership can be determined by a number of potentially conflicting 
criteria, including conduct, desire and non-conformity to conventional gender roles.  
Thus, being queer is not based on what you do, nor is it based on how you were born.  
What defines a person as queer is what she or he believes.  If one believes that 
subordination is bad, if one opposes homophobia, if one opposes racism, if one 
opposes sexism, then one is queer.  I am not alone in defining a sexual orientation 
based on epistemological opposition to subordination.9  At the end of the movie In 
and Out10 the high school teacher played by Kevin Kline might lose his job because 
he comes out as gay.  The defining moment is when one by one, all of his friends, 
students, and colleagues, proclaim that they are also gay.  One can read this moment 
in the film as the osmosis of high theory into popular culture.  We know that many or 
most of the characters who come out as gay in order to defend the gay teacher are 
involved in or desire only opposite-sex sexual contact.  But they are not coming out 
as people who desire or engage in same-sex contact.  Instead, they come out as 
opponents to subordination on the basis of marginalized sexuality, making the 
marginalized position majoritarian merely by altering the definition of gay from 
conduct or status to belief. 
Under this theory, the queers are those who oppose subordination.  Building on 
the insights of critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist legal theory, 
queer legal theory seeks to intervene in subordination on the basis of sex, gender, 
race, class and sexual orientation.  If “we are the champions,” queer is one way to 
understand who “we” are. 
The next question turns on the issue of champions.  Those of us opposed to 
subordination might feel uncomfortable trumpeting “we are the champions, no time 
for losers, we are the champions of the world,”11 as this declaration seems 
inconsistent with equality.  Few anti-subordination advocates would want to divide 
the world into champions and losers.  I would like to suggest, however, that there 
might exist something akin to an anti-subordination champion.  We could build on 
our re-definition of marginalized sexuality as queer rather than gay, and visualize an 
outcome in which “being a champion” means to champion anti-subordination. 
With a new theme song and sense of our task, the question remains on how 
society is to attain this goal.  Post-structuralism teaches that multiple ways exist to 
tackle particular problems, and progressive movements include a tremendous 
diversity of good faith anti-subordination perspectives.12  Rejecting this 
                                                                
9See, e.g., Michael Warner, Introduction, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET:  QUEER POLITICS 
AND SOCIAL THEORY (Michael Warner ed., 1993). 
10In and Out (Paramount Pictures, 1997). 
11Queen, supra note 6. 
12See, e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 99 
U. CHI. L. FORUM 21, 46-48 (1999) (describing various strands of feminism). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
34 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:31 
methodological multiplicity results in an essentialism that will not hold up under 
scrutiny.  Michael Warner suggests in his recent book that Hawaii’s reciprocal 
beneficiaries legislation, providing many of the benefits of marriage (though not all 
of them by a long shot) is a “politically brokered compromise” and a dangerous form 
of second class citizenship.13  I suspect that Warner’s view is too narrow.  Reciprocal 
beneficiaries legislation allows same sex couples, and other couples who are barred 
from marrying, to engage in some partnership-related activities, recognized and 
validated by state law.14  The movement to broaden the range of state-recognized 
intimate affiliations requires that advocates seek both marriage and alternatives to 
marriage (such as civil unions in Vermont, reciprocal beneficiary relationships in 
Hawaii, and domestic partnership protections in other jurisdictions).  These 
alternative claims complement rather than compete with one another:  if the Hawaii 
Supreme Court had not been on the verge of recognizing same-sex marriage, then the 
Hawaii legislature would not have responded by enacting what was at the time the 
broadest set of rights and responsibilities accorded to same-sex couples in the U.S.15  
Moreover, a legal regime that recognizes only marriage (opposite-sex and same-sex) 
remains subordinating to the extent that it ignores non-marital intimate affiliations 
and normalizes those who do enter into marriage.16  The optimal system would 
instead recognize a range of intimate affiliations, including marriage, but not 
preferencing it as morally, religiously or naturally superior.17  Recognizing reciprocal 
beneficiaries alongside domestic partnerships, civil unions, and marriage is 
consistent with this larger goal.  In other words, multiple modes of legal claims can 
co-exist and need not be compared along zero-sum lines.  Among the array of legal 
claims are the ones that mine private law to reconstruct our understandings of 
intimate affiliation. 
The two examples of re-structuring the legal regulation of intimate affiliations 
that I will address here may seem retrograde or assimilationist.  However, there is an 
argument to be made that they are also interventions in conventional ways of seeing 
both problems and solutions.  Specifically, privatized understandings of intimate 
                                                                
13MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL:  SEX, POLITICS AND THE ETHICS OF 
QUEER LIFE 126 (1999).  The same arguments can be made regarding Vermont’s civil unions, a 
parallel status to marriage that is available only to same-sex couples.   
14In Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries must be barred from marrying, so same sex couples 
can be reciprocal beneficiaries.  HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572-1 to 572–7 (Supp. 1999).  In 
Vermont, in contrast, reciprocal beneficiaries must be barred from both marriage and civil 
uions so that same-sex romantic couples cannot be reciprocal beneficiaries in Vermont.  VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (Supp. 2000). 
15Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Approves Benefits Package for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, April 
20, 1997, at A3. 
16See Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian 
Marriage Will Not ‘Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,’ 79  VA. L. 
REV. 1535 (1993); Paula Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family 
Recognition, 5 J. L. & POL’Y. 107 (1996); Janet E. Halley, Recognition, Rights, Normalization, 
Regulation: Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL 
RECOGINTION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS:  A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2000). 
17Ertman, supra note 2. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/6
2000] CONTRACT SPORTS 35 
affiliation contribute to the denaturalization of the conventional heterosexual family, 
making it possible to recognize same-sex and other marginalized affiliations.  I will 
describe two examples.  The first relates to same-sex cohabitation contracts, and the 
second proposes importing debtor-creditor law to the law governing heterosexual 
marriage. 
First, same-sex cohabitation contracts.  It is consistent with the current direction 
of doctrine and theory regarding same-sex sexuality to mine the emancipatory 
potential of relationship contracts.  In 1992, the Georgia Supreme Court enforced a 
cohabitation contract between two lesbians, named Crooke and Gilden respectively.18  
Gilden sought specific performance of their written relationship contract, which 
contained a merger clause.  A merger clause provides that the writing represents the 
complete agreement of the parties, and that evidence from outside the writing is not 
admissible to determine the meaning of the agreement.19  Gilden came to court 
saying:  we have a writing, it contains a merger clause, please enforce it.  Crooke 
tried to prevent the court from enforcing the agreement, arguing that the agreement 
was unenforceable as it was supported by illicit and immoral consideration.  The 
Georgia Supreme Court rejected Crooke’s argument.  It invoked the parol evidence 
rule, which is the legal equivalent of putting on blinders, relying on the merger 
clause to conclude that the court can only look at the writing and not at any extrinsic 
evidence.20  It refused, in other words, to consider whether the relationship 
agreement between two female romantic partners was supported by illicit and 
immoral consideration.  As a result, the Georgia Supreme Court enforced the same-
sex relationship contract.21  
Similarly, in Posik v. Layton, the Florida Court of Appeals enforced a same-sex 
cohabitation contract.22  Just as the Georgia Supreme Court invoked the classical 
contract doctrine of parol evidence, the Florida court invoked the liberal ideal of 
freedom of contract to enforce the cohabitation agreement.23  While Crooke v. Gilden 
was decided in the shadow of Bowers v. Hardwick,24 Posik v. Layton was decided in 
the shadow of Florida’s affirmative bans on same-sex marriage and adoption by gay 
people.25  The Posik court used freedom of contract rhetoric to navigate around the 
shadow of the anti-gay law: 
Even though the agreement was couched in terms of a personal services 
contract, it was intended to be much more.  It was a nuptial agreement 
                                                                
18Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992). 
19JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIF. COMMERICAL CODE 103-4 (5th ed. 2000). 
20Crooke, 414 S.E.2d at 646.  It further reasoned that even if the parol evidence was 
relevant, the sexual element of the relationship between Crooke and Gilden was “incidental to 
the contract rather than required by it.”   Id. 
21Id. 
22695 So.2d 759 (Fla. App. 1997), review denied, 699 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1997). 
23Id. at 761. 
24478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute as applied to people 
engaged in same-sex activity). 
25Posik v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759, 761 (1997), review denied, 699 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1997). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
36 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:31 
entered into by two parties that the State prohibits from marrying.  But 
even though the State has prevented same-sex marriages and same-sex 
adoptions it has not prohibited this type of agreement.  By prohibiting 
same-sex marriages, the State has merely denied homosexuals the rights 
granted to married partners that flow naturally from the marital 
relationship. . . . But the State has not denied those individuals their right 
to either will their property as they see fit nor to privately commit by 
contract to spend their money as they choose.  The State is not thusly 
condoning the lifestyles of homosexuals or unmarried live-ins, it is merely 
recognizing their constitutional private property and contract rights.26 
This language suggests that contract law may provide an under-explored mechanism 
whereby marginalized people, here gay people, can obtain some rights (and incur 
responsibilities) that they might not otherwise. 
While contract doctrine, such as the parol evidence rule, allows the court to 
recognize same-sex relationship contracts, it also presents unmistakable dangers.  
Crooke encourages same-sex couples to be quiet about their personal lives and about 
their sexuality in particular.27  If the writing between Crooke and Gilden had 
included reference to their relationship such as a recitation of their reason for 
entering the agreement (by referencing the exchange of services of a “lover, 
companion, homemaker, travelling companion, housekeeper and cook”),28 the court 
might have refused to enforce the agreement, reasoning that the agreement’s 
“rendition of sex and other services naturally flowing from sexual cohabitation was 
an inseparable part of the consideration for the so-called cohabitation agreement.”29  
The parol evidence rule merely excludes extrinsic evidence, not evidence in the 
writing itself.  Moreover, power disparities within relationships may jeopardize free 
choice in entering the agreement.  These are important questions for people who are 
concerned with power imbalances.  However, as a practical matter Gilden got more 
than she would have without asserting her rights under the cohabitation contract.  
She enjoyed specific performance, and at least some legal visibility.  The judges had 
to look at her as a legal subject and citizen.   
In prior work I have argued that the ability to contract can be part of what 
constructs one as a legal person.30  In the Nineteenth Century and beforehand, white 
women and African-American men and women were legally defined in part by their 
inability to enter binding contracts.31  Those doctrines changed with the advent of the 
                                                                
26Id. 
27Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But 
Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996). 
28Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to enforce a same-sex 
relationship contract on the grounds that its reference to the relationship of the parties as 
lovers made it a meretricious contract). 
29Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410 (Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing Jones v. 
Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1981)).    
30Ertman, supra note 27, at 1162-64. 
31Id. at 1163. 
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Married Women’s Property Acts and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.32  In a nutshell, the Married 
Women’s Property Acts provided that married women have the right to contract and 
own property.33  Similarly, § 1981 provided that “all persons . . . shall have the same 
right . . .  to make and enforce contracts . . .  as is enjoyed by white citizens.”34  As 
with the cohabitation contract cases, contract here presents a double-edged sword 
presupposing control over property and equality of bargaining power.  However 
some of the problems of inequality inherent in contract may be addressed by 
accounting for the ways that law and society influence each other.  The intermediate 
step of recognizing gay people’s contractual rights could set the stage for a more full 
exercise of rights.35 
One final benefit of contract analysis is related to issues of moral rhetoric.  Gay 
and other marginalized people tend to suffer moral condemnation because of their 
marginal (and often minority) status.  Majoritarian morality is one of the primary 
impediments to equality for sexual minorities.  Majoritarian morality often supports 
traditional family values, defining heterosexual marriage as legitimate because of its 
difference from non-heterosexual, non-marital arrangements.  Contract theory and 
doctrine offer a respite from majoritian and moral views.  Same sex couples, for 
example, can contract for rights and responsibilities that they cannot get from a 
legislature that is held hostage to majoritarian morality.  In sum, contractual analysis 
of same sex relationships is both a practical solution to the marginalization of most 
gay couples and a theoretical foundation for constructing gay personhood. 
Having explored how contract doctrine can facilitate legal visibility for same-sex 
couples, I now turn to focus on the heterosexual family.  My second example of how 
private law mechanisms can reconstruct the family proposes importing debtor-
creditor law to family law to redistribute power and assets within the heterosexual 
family.  In an article titled Commercializing Marriage,36 I proposed importing 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 to domestic relations law as a means to 
reimburse primary homemakers for their contributions to family wealth.37  Article 9 
of the UCC governs the relationship between a debtor and a creditor when the 
creditor takes an interest in collateral to secure payment of a debt or performance of 
an obligation.38  My proposal provides a way to recognize the ways in which primary 
wage earners owe a debt to their primary homemaking spouses.  Specifically, 
primary homemakers contribute to primary wager-earners’ earning potential when 
                                                                
32Id. at 1163-64. 
33For an excellent discussion of the evolution of married women’s property acts, see Reva 
B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:  Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 
1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994). 
3442 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). 
35For an argument for the progressive potential of recognizing marginalized people’s 
ability to engage in market relationships, which she calls “economic personality,” as distinct 
from “political personality,” see Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An 
Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 242 (1999).   
36Ertman, supra note 3. 
37Id.; U.C.C. § 9-101 et seq. (1990). 
38U.C.C. §§ 9-102; 1-201(37) (1990). 
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they perform homemaking services and forego opportunities to develop their own 
earning potential.  To recognize this debt and provide a self-help remedy if the 
primary wage-earner does not repay it by sharing his income with his primary 
homemaking spouse (i.e., if the couple divorces), I suggest that the couple execute 
what I call a Premarital Security Agreement (PSA) at the outset of the marriage.  In 
the PSA, the spouses agree that if a debt arises during the marriage through the 
primary homemaker’s contributions to family wealth, the primary wage-earner must 
repay that debt to the primary homemaker.  This model gives the socially weak 
primary homemaker a very powerful socio-economic role as an Article 9 secured 
creditor.39  Those familiar with Article 9 know that being a secured creditor is a 
powerful advantage, in large part because you get repossession rights.  If the debtor 
refuses to pay, you can seize the collateral, and either keep it or sell it to pay off the 
debt.40  The private industry of “repo people,” hired by homemakers, out seizing 
computers and cars and other collateral owned by primary wage-earners, could 
destablize marriage as a hierarchical institution. 
It may seem strange to talk about heterosexual marriage when this conference has 
focused on same-sex sexuality.  Why should gay people care about the plight of 
displaced homemakers?  I suggest that queers should be concerned about the non-
commodification of homemaking labor.  Not just to be friendly, not even to be 
liberal, but in fact because the definition of queer demands we pay attention to 
gender subordination generally, not just in the context of same-sex sexuality.  The re-
definition of queer posits that identity is socially constructed, and that identity 
constructions can change in ways that alleviate subordination.41  According to queer 
theory (along with postmodern theory and much of feminist theory), sex, race, 
gender and sexual orientation are not natural, but rather social artifacts.42  These 
identity categories are not transhistorical, but instead change in various contexts.  For 
example, sex could be determined by a lot of things.  It could be determined by your 
genitalia, by your chromosomes, by your identity (what you choose to call yourself), 
or by secondary sexual characteristics.  Clearly some people change their sex, or do 
not neatly fit into the category man or women.  Thus we see that sex is not essential, 
is not biological, is not inevitable.43  Social judgment rather than biological fact, 
declares that a person is male or female.   
Similarly, race is socially constructed.  At various times race has been 
determined in different ways.  Until recently, the U.S. Census did not ask people to 
identify their race.  The census taker instead looked at a person and made a racial 
                                                                
39Ertman, supra note 3, at 94-95. 
40U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to 9-505 (1990). 
41Martha M. Ertman, Oscar Wilde: Paradoxical Poster Child for Both Identity and Post-
Identity, 25 L. & SOC. INQ. 153 (2000). 
42Id. at 169-71. 
43See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (1999) (holding that a transsexual woman is 
biologically male).  Two sexes do not exhaust the possibilities.  As one commentator 
explained, “I am biologically female but don’t identify as a woman.  I look like a man but am 
not a man.  The most suitable word to describe me is transgendered.”  Jennifer Levi & 
Shannon Minter, Female to Male, Nine to Five, GIRLFRIENDS, June 2000, at 10 (quoting 
Jennifer Levi, a “trans-identified lesbian”).   
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classification based on appearance (i.e., skin color or facial features).44  Over time 
the Census gradually evolved toward asking people to determine their own race.  
Along the line, multi-racial people were classified differently at different times.  
Sometimes race turned on the father’s race, sometimes on the race of the non-white 
parent, and still other times on the mother’s race.45  The changing methods of 
determining race demonstrate that it is a social construction rather than biological 
fact. 
Sexual orientation is also socially constructed.  It can be based on identity (what 
one calls oneself), desire (past or current), activity (past or present), or gender 
performance.  Particular situations highlight the difficulty of any particular method 
of determining sexual orientation.  Are female cohabitants who were once lovers but 
have not had sex in years still lesbians?  If they are sexual, but do not call themselves 
lesbians, are they gay?  What is the sexual orientation of a heterosexually married 
woman who desires same-sex sexual contact but does not act on that desire?  How 
about a woman who identifies as gay but desires sexual contact with men?  What if 
she has had most sexual experiences with men, but now is sexual with a woman?  
How about a woman who has been heterosexually married for years, but has affairs 
with women?  What if a woman is romantically involved with a male-to-female 
transsexual?  The judgment calls required to answer these questions reveal that 
sexual orientation, like gender and race, is socially constructed rather than grounded 
in biological fact. 
One danger of focusing on the social construction of identity is that society tends 
to focus on marked, marginalized identities.  We talk about the contingency of 
African-American identity, not whiteness.  We talk about the contingency of gay and 
lesbian categories, not heterosexuality.  This pattern is dangerous, as it leaves the 
unmarked category (whiteness, heterosexuality, maleness) unchallenged in its 
naturalized status.  As Dorothy Allison and Esther Newton urged, it is imperative to 
deconstruct heterosexuality first.46  One effective way to deconstruct heterosexuality 
(in other words, to denaturalize the heterosexual family) is to intervene in its legal 
construction.  Every proposal to destabilize the construction of the family as natural, 
biological or inevitable implicitly furthers this project. 
Commercializing marriage and contractualizing intimate affiliation generally are 
ways to destabilize the construction of one form of intimate affiliation (“the family”) 
as natural, biological, or inevitable.  Commercializing marriage, in particular, 
denaturalizes the family in at least four ways.  It could contribute to destabilizing 
compulsory heterosexuality, demonstrate the performativity of gender and sexual 
orientation, queer the state, and pave the road for state recognition of same-sex 
relationships. 
If queers sign on to projects such as alleviating the plight of displaced 
homemakers, doing so could also benefit gay people by denaturalizing the family.  
We have quite a long way to go in dismantling what Adrienne Rich famously called 
                                                                
44U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2 (1959); U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 3 (1971); U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States B-2 (1980). 
45Id. 
46Lisa Duggan, supra note 8, at 179, 185. 
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compulsory heterosexuality.47  By increasing financial power for women in 
heterosexual relationships, commercializing marriage creates exit options for 
women.  Providing a way out is undoubtedly consistent with queer theory and 
political goals.   
A second way that private law imports to domestic relations law denaturalize 
family is that contractual models of intimacy demonstrate the performative nature of 
gender.  Judith Butler has insightfully written about the social construction of 
gender, arguing that it is not real, true or biological, but rather a performance.48  She 
uses the example of drag queens to illustrate that there is nothing real about sex or 
gender.  A man in a dress shows that gender is a performance, revealing that women 
in dresses similarly perform gender.  Even claims that gender is natural reveal the 
contingency of gender.  When Aretha Franklin sings “You Make Me Feel Like a 
Natural Woman”49  the operative term is like, suggesting that Aretha declares that she 
can only impersonate the real thing, because there is no such a thing as a natural 
woman – only the idea that gender is natural.50  Just listing a few of the activities that 
many women engage in each morning to prepare to face the world, such as styling 
hair, shaving legs and underarms, plucking eyebrows, and bleaching mustaches, 
demonstrates that there is no such thing as a natural woman.51  As Simone de 
Beauvoir famously stated, “one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one.”52  
A third reason to champion private law interventions into domestic relations law 
is that doing so has the potential to queer the state.  Lisa Duggan has pointed out that 
queer theory and activism, which is really what this symposium explores, often seem 
to be headed in opposite directions.53  She suggests that activism and theory should 
be both transformative and effective; we need to be both liberational and 
subversive.54  Just seeking same-sex marriage all by itself is only going to be 
                                                                
47Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN 
AND GAY STUDIES READER 227 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).  
48JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990). 
49ARETHA FRANKLIN, [YOU MAKE ME FEEL LIKE A] NATURAL WOMEN, THE VERY BEST OF 
ARETHA FRANKLIN:  THE 60’S (1994). 
50Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Subordination, 27-28 in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN 
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) (“When Aretha Franklin sings, ‘you make 
me feel like a natural woman,’ she seems at first to suggest that some natural potential of her 
biological sex is actualized by her participation in the cultural position ‘woman’ as object of 
heterosexual recognition. . . . [S]he also seems fully and paradoxically mindful that that 
confirmation is never guaranteed, that that effect of naturalness is only achieved as a 
consequence of that moment of heterosexual recognition.  After all, Aretha sings, you make 
me feel like a natural woman, suggesting that this is a kind of metaphorical substitution, and 
act of imposture, a kind of sublime and momentary participation in an ontological illusion 
produced by the mundane operation of heterosexual drag.”). 
51Additional, and common interventions to create female gender identity include applying 
make-up, selecting appropriate clothing and accessories, and enhancing secondary sexual 
characteristics such as breast size. 
52SIMONE DE BOUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 301 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., 1974). 
53Duggan, supra note 8. 
54Duggan, supra note 8, at 193. 
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liberational, it is only going to get some gay people goodies.  It seems unlikely to 
intervene in fundamental hierarchies that elevate some of us as morally or naturally 
superior to others, and it may not significantly denaturalize the family.  Even gay 
marriage could leave intact the presumption that some kinds of relationships are 
natural and/or moral thereby deserve legal protection and support while others are 
stigmatized as unnatural.  Doctrinal interventions should therefore be both 
liberational and transformative.  PSAs have the potential to be both.  They liberate 
primary homemakers from the indigency associated with the non-commodification 
of their contributions to family wealth.  They are transformative, showing that the 
role of primary homemaker and primary wage-earner are performative, that anybody 
could do them.55  It could be someone with breasts and a vagina.  It also could be 
somebody with a penis.  That very redefinition of a primary homemaker, into 
someone who has the market characteristics of a secured creditor, powerfully 
changes family as we currently understand it.   
Fourth and finally, importing private law to the law governing intimate 
affiliations could facilitate state recognition of same-sex relationships.  The primary 
barrier to that recognition is hostility to relationships that are deemed unnatural.  As 
long as the only kinds of relationships recognized by the state are those comprised of 
one man and one woman, who can engage in penile-vaginal penetration,56 the state 
cannot recognize same-sex relationships.  There is a myth that this heterosexual dyad 
is the only kind of real family.  Yet this “real family” represents only a fraction of 
the population; fully thirty percent of American households are “non family,” 
meaning that people live alone or with non-relatives.57  If we commercialize 
marriage and contractualize relationships that are often understood as natural, we 
might over time see intimate affiliation as not necessarily a matter of engaging in 
natural or unnatural acts, but instead of engaging in agreements about exchanging 
resources (financial, emotional, social, physical).  Under this analysis, legal 
regulation is functional rather than judgmental.  If a consensual adult intimate 
affiliation exists, the state would not have to shy away from recognizing it on 
grounds that some religions deem it unnatural.   
In conclusion, this panel is about making progress in obtaining benefits for 
people who are marginalized by law and by society.  To paraphrase Catharine 
MacKinnon, law is not everything, but it’s not nothing either.58  It can be used in a 
lot of creative ways.  Specifically, importing private business models to domestic 
relations law has the potential to contribute to a reconstruction of law and sexuality 
to recognize that we can all be champions.  At a minimum, a focus on contract sports 
offers models in which many more of us win than the current, naturalized, model of 
family. 
                                                                
55Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage:  An Intersexional Approach, 75 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 1215 (1998). 
56For further discussion of the penile-vaginal-penetration requirement for legal marriages, 
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